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Abstract
This paper argues that constraining people to choose consumption and labor
under nite Shannon capacity produces results in line with U.S. business cycle data
as well as secular movements in consumption and labor supply. The model has a
simple partial equilibrium setting in which risk averse consumers keep high labor
supply and low consumption prole at early stage of life to hedge against wealth
uctuations. They rationally choose to keep consumption and labor unchanged
until they collect enough information. I nd that at high frequency consumption
appears to be more sluggish than labor supply. However, when people decide
to change consumption they do so by a large amount. This combination leads
to higher variance of consumption with respect to labor supply. The model also
nds high persistence and strong comovement of consumption and employment
and delayed response of consumption and labor with respect to shocks to wages.
Positive changes in wages generate an increase in long run value of consumption
while the change in long run values of labor is negligible. Furthermore, the e¤ects
on labor and consumption of a shock to wages propagate slowly over time due to
peoples endogenous choice of information. These ndings suggest that rational
inattention o¤ers a promising avenue to bridge the gap between theory and U.S.
data at business cycle frequency as well as in the long run.
E-mail: Antonella.Tutino@frb.gov. The views in this paper are solely the responsibility of the
author and should not be interpreted as reecting the views of the Federal Reserve Board or any other
person associated with the Federal Reserve System.
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1 Introduction
Existing macroeconomic theories have trouble tting empirical regularities in consump-
tion and labor at both high and low frequencies. Existing models match some U.S.
business cycle facts at the expense of secular facts. Despite the progress in the eld and
rich modelling tools, one peculiar dimension of the business cycle that still troubles the
literature is the labor market. As a matter of theory, business cycle and growth facts
on consumption and labor should emerge from a framework in which consumers contin-
uously solve dynamic optimization problems. As a matter of data, most of the dynamic
optimization models proposed by modern macroeconomic theory generate predictions at
odds with U.S. evidence.1
The trouble is that specications of neoclassical rational expectations model that cap-
ture consumption and labor movements at business cycle frequencies seem inadequate to
explain postwar movements in these variables. Starting from Lucas and Rapping (1969),
several papers have tried to reconcile theory and facts by focussing on macro and micro es-
timates of labor supply elasticities,2 identifying labor supply and demand through search
and matching models3 and questioning the validity of dynamic optimization framework
as an appropriate representation of peoples actual consumption and labor behavior.4
This paper suggests an explanation of U.S. business cycle facts and secular facts based
on rational inattention.5 My choice to model people constrained by nite information
processing capacity agrees with intuition and, as the paper shows, with the empirical
evidence.
In my model, rational households consume, work and pay attention to their wealth to
maximize their lifetime utility. In the baseline model, I assume that consumers are risk
adverse and have a constant Frisch elasticity of substitution. Under rational inattention,
they cannot know the exact value of their wealth in each period due to information-
processing frictions. Each period they choose information about wealth within the limits
of their capacity and decide on the basis of that information how much to consume
and work. Realized consumption and employment are used to update rationally their
knowledge of wealth. In my setting wages follows a Markov process and its distribution is
known before consumers make their work and consumption decisions. Thus, uctuations
in wealth are due to movements in labor and consumption as well as movements in wages.
Consumers keep track of wealth by processing information through a Shannon channel.
Having a bound on information processing rate suits the observation that people do
not check their account on a daily basis, nor they are likely to keep track of the incidence
of their expenses and hours worked on their lifetime wealth at high frequency. Using
1See, e.g., Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers (1985), Barro and King (1984), Hall (1997) and Chang
and Kim (2005).
2See, e.g., King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988), Rogerson and Wallenius (2007) and Shimer (2005, 2008).
3See, e.g., Rotemberg (1998), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Shimer (2005).
4See, e.g., Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers (1985).
5cfr., Shannon (1948), Sims (1988, 1998, 2003, 2006), Tutino (2008).
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Shannon channels as modelling device has also the nice feature of providing a natural
bound for information ow which depends only on the distribution of the variables that
are passed through the channel, regardless of the characteristic of such a channel. This
in turns makes the choice of this kind of information friction free from unexplained
assumptions on individual characteristics.
More importantly, the predictions of the model agree with U.S. data along the dimen-
sions analyzed. I show that even in a simple partial equilibrium setting with focus on the
supply side of the labor market, a model in which people choose labor and consumption
under information processing constraint à la Sims is able to explain several features of the
data. In particular, my setting delivers four results: 1. the ratio of standard deviation
of consumption over hours worked bigger than one; 2. persistence in consumption and
labor supply; 3. comovement of consumption, labor and wealth; 4. endogenously persis-
tent propagation of shocks to wages that delivers a long-term variation in consumptions
growth and a negligible e¤ect on long-term labor supply.
To understand the mechanism behind these results, consider what happens in an
equivalent model with full information. With stochastic wages and interest rates con-
sistent with consumption smoothing, a consumer with log utility and constant Frisch
elasticity accumulates wealth during early periods of his life by limiting consumption
and increasing work e¤ort. In such a context, uctuations in wealth are mostly due to
uctuations in labor income rather than consumption plans. With information process-
ing constraints, consumers cannot know the exact value of their wealth. They keep track
of their wealth imperfectly by choosing signals as informative about wealth as channel ca-
pacity allows them to. Log utility in consumption and convex disutility of labor together
with low information ow make households work hard and save at early stage of their
life. With low information ow and, as a result, low informativeness of the signal each
period, households keep savings and labor supply high to make sure that they can sustain
their consumption. As wealth accumulates, the signal on high values of wealth becomes
sharper, calling for a major adjustment in behavior. The size of the adjustment is bigger
the lower their processing capacity. This result is intuitive: the longer consumers wait
to modify their behavior, the bigger is the variation in consumption and labor once they
acknowledge the change in wealth through information processed. Furthermore, in my
model, consumption is more sluggish than labor supply. The rationale for this nding
lies in the preferences of consumers who dislike having to change their consumption fre-
quently while having constant Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Such preferences imply
that people review their consumption plan signicantly when they realize that they have
saved too much or too little with respect to their lifetime possibilities. This mechanism in
turns leads to higher volatility of realized consumption with respect to labor supply and
provides a rationale for the rst result. The e¤ect is stronger the lower the information
ow.
The autocorrelation of consumption and employment stems from a similar logic. With
signals that bring about low information, changes in behavior are slow at high frequency:
the news about wealth are not enough to modify yesterdays consumption and labor
supply. This mechanism implies that consumers maintain the same consumption and
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labor prole and keep accumulating information until evidence of changes in wealth
suggests otherwise.
As for the third nding, my model predicts stronger comovement of contemporaneous
consumption, labor and wealth the higher the information ow is. If information capacity
is low, then contemporaneous consumption and labor comove strongly with lagged val-
ues of wealth. Contemporaneous consumption, labor and wealth are strongly linked via
the budget constraint. Moreover, the budget constraint a¤ects the choice of the policy
function -i.e., optimal joint distribution between wealth and behavior-. With high infor-
mation ow, consumersoptimal policy commands wealth and behavior to be as related
as possible so that the outcome from consumption and labor supply are very informative
about wealth. If information ow is low, consumption and labor are strongly correlated
with past values of wealth. This result is driven by the rational (Bayesian) update of
consumersinformation. Each period the household gets information about wealth and
observes consumption and labor choices. Low information ows makes the signal on
wealth imprecise forcing the household to rely mostly on the information content of his
consumption and labor. This translates into periods of inertial behavior until the infor-
mation collected signals enough variation in wealth to justify a change in the choices.
This observation together with Bayesian updating explain why, in presence of nite rate
of information, consumers delay their reaction to changes in wealth. The results are
robust to several utility specications.
The last result of the model concerns the short and long term response of consump-
tion and labor to uctuations in wages. Following an increase in wage, in the short run
both consumption and labor increase due to an income e¤ect generated by the inter-
play of the curvature of the utility function with the information processing constraint.
People slowly process signals on the increase in wealth due to savings and labor income.
While processing information, consumption and employment behaviors exhibit a slug-
gish dynamic. When people realize that wealth has grown, they increase consumption
permanently and start enjoying more leisure. Thus, in the model, the long term e¤ect of
an increase in wage leads to an higher long run value of consumption with respect to its
pre-shock path while the long run value of employment is similar to the pre-shock case.
These short and long run responses of consumption and labor following a change in wage
as well as the transitional dynamics are consistent with the U.S. evidence documented in
the real business cycle literature as well as U.S. growths facts. 6
Together with the contribution to the macroeconomic labor literature, this paper is
closely related to the literature of rational inattention, with particular reference to Sims
(2003, 2006), Tutino (2008) and Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2008a, 2008b). This paper
departs from Sims (2003) and Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2008a, 2008b) since the ex-
ante characterization of uncertainty is not limited to the Gaussian distribution nor the
framework is constrained to be linear quadratic. Instead, as in Sims (2006) and Tutino
(2008), this paper presents a fully endogenous choice of distribution of uncertainty in a
dynamic context and allows for risk aversion in the specication of agentspreferences.
6See, e.g., Lucas and Rapping (1969), MaCurdy (1981), Hall , Cooley and Nason (1995).
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The present framework extends Tutino (2008) by augmenting the choice space of people
to consumption and labor as opposite to only consumption. This extension generates
endogenously an allocation of attention between the two activities -consumption and
work-, and, in turn, a di¤erent degree of persistence between consumption and labor
on the basis of the stochastic properties of the joint distribution of actions and wealth
chosen by the consumers. An example might help clarifying the intuition behind this
property. Suppose that a person works the same amount of hours everyday. Given
this behavior, the person learns nothing about wealth through his labor supply. In this
case, uctuations of wealth are acknowledged mostly through the information content
of consumption realizations and the optimal distribution of uncertainty is similar to the
one derived in Tutino (2008). The household might have a better understanding of
his nancial possibilities by varying either consumption or leisure or both and thereby
improve his utility. If wages are relatively stable, it might be optimal to keep labor
supply xed and o¤set uctuations in wealth with changes in consumption. On the other
hand, if wages change signicantly, it might pay o¤ to vary the amount of labor supply
and maintain a smooth consumption prole. Amount and directions of these changes
in behavior depend on the relative cost of changing consumption with respect to labor
supply, the relative benets of being better informed about wealth through either source
and householdspreferences implied by the curvature of the utility function. Thus, in
this framework, predominance of income vs. substitution e¤ect does not depend only on
peoples utility as standard macro literature delivers, but also on the relative attention
that people pay to current consumption and hour worked as source of information about
wealth.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The next section presents the model
and its main assumptions while section 3 illustrates the computation strategy. Section
4 is the core of the paper. It analyzes the main ndings and contrasts them with US
data. Section 4 also provides statistics and predictions of di¤erent specications of the
model. Section 5 shows the properties of the optimal policy whereas Section 6 concludes.
Appendices cover the mathematical proofs (Appendix A), additional statistics for the
prediction of the model (Appendix B), a low-dimension analytical solution for the model
(Appendix C) and the pseudocode (Appendix D).
2 The Model
The model is a one sector partial equilibrium discrete time problem. To x notation and
intuition, rst I discuss the model without information processing constraint. Then, I
introduce information processing constraints à la Shannon and present the full rational
inattention model.
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2.1 A version of the model under innite processing capacity
The economy is populated by numerous households who maximize the expected dis-
counted value of their utility. Utility, u (C;L), is dened over a consumption good,
C, and labor, L and is strictly increasing and strictly concave in both its arguments,
limC!0 uC (C;L) = +1,8L 2 [0; 1], limL!0 uL (C;L) = +1 8C  0. Moreover, I as-
sume that utility is homogeneous and additively separable in consumption and leisure.
In particular:
u (Ct; Lt) = log (Ct)  
 + 1
L+1t (1)
where  is the inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply, " > 0, and  > 0 is a constant
disutility associated to labor.
Each period, people are endowed with one unit of time (L  1) and face a stochastic
real wage, s, in exchange for their labor e¤ort. Wages follow a stationary i.i.d. Markov
process with transition s (s0js) = Pr (st+1  s0jst = s).
Consumerswealth, W , evolves according to previousperiod savings (W   C), aug-
mented with a xed and exogenous interest rate, R, and labor income, s  L. Given the
assumption on the wage process, the problem is stationary. The recursive formulation of
the households problem is:
V (Wt) = max
Ct;Lt
u (Ct; Lt) + EtV (Wt+1) (2)
s.t.
Wt+1 = R (Wt   Ct) + stLt (3)
W0 given (4)
Lt  1, Ct  0 8 (L;C) , 8t (5)
Note that in this setting the only source of uncertainty is wage, s. So long as wages
are a Markov i.i.d. process -as assumed-, uncertainty about wages translates directly
into uncertainty about next periods wealth. It follows that the initial condition on
wealth, (4), is equivalent to knowing s0. Expectations of the Bellman value next period
- V (W 0)- are taken conditional on the current value of W . Moreover, I assume that
R = 1. Optimality conditions of the household with respect to consumption and labor
imply the following contemporaneous relation
Lt =

st
Ct
 1

(6)
So long as both  and  are nite and with a desire to smooth consumption implied by
(1), condition (6) implies that labor will change through time reecting changes in wages.
The intertemporal optimal condition for consumption is:
1 = Et

Ct+1
Ct

(7)
6
and the equivalent for labor
Lt
st
= Et

Lt+1
st+1

(8)
To match the joint behavior of per capita consumption and per capita hours that
we observe in US data, the model should produce (1) cyclical movements: procyclical
behavior of per capita consumption and per capita hours worked; (2) secular movements:
labor supplys response to permanent changes in wages is negligible while consumptions
responses are signicant;
As Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers (1985) noted, the rst order conditions (6)-(8)
cannot simultaneously account for facts (1) and (2). They prove that U.S. data strongly
reject specications of the kind (6)-(8), questioning the validity of continuous dynamic
optimization as useful framework to match data on consumption and labor. The next
section proposes a dynamic optimization problem based on rational inattention theory
whose predictions are in line with observed time series of consumption and labor.
2.2 Rational inattention version of the model
Under Rational Inattention Theory (Sims, 2003, 2006), information is fully and freely
available to the agents. However, people cannot process quickly and precisely all the
information due to Shannons processing constraints. Recognizing that attention is a
scarce resource, people select information guided by their utility. The idea of rational
inattention stems from Information Theory laid out in the seminal work of Shannon
(1948). Shannon (1948) provides a rigorous statistical denition of uncertainty about a
random event X and then characterizes the maximum reduction of uncertainty about
X that can be achieved through the knowledge of another event, Y . The uncertainty
associated to an event X that takes value in fx1; ::; xng with probability mass function
pX is given by the entropy of X:
H (X) =  
nX
i=1
pX (xi) log2 pX (xi) : (9)
Expressions like (9)7 provide a general and careful description of uncertainty associ-
ated to a random event based solely on its distribution.8 To see how the initial uncertainty
about X -H (X)- can be reduced, consider another random event, Y , with distribution
pY and values in fy1; ::; ymg. Let pXY be the joint distribution of X and Y . Then, the
maximum amount of uncertainty about X that can be reduced through the stochastic
7In (9), base 2 in the logarithm corresponds to calculating entropy in bits.
8Entropy satises four criteria that make it a universal measure of uncertainty: continuity, symmetry,
maximality and additivity. The latter is probably the most appealing from the perspective of economic
theory in that it relates the uncertainty of a system with the uncertainty of its subparts. This property
makes entropy a suitable tool to evaluate uncertainty in complex economic systems.
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knowledge of Y is given by their mutual information
I (p (x; y)) =
nX
i=1
mX
j=1
pXY (xi; yj) log2

pXY (xi; yj)
pX (xi) pY (yj)

(10)
where I have used I (p (x; y))  I (X;Y ) to make explicit that mutual information
depends on the copula of the random event X and the random event Y . Mutual infor-
mation measures dependence of two random events: it is positive and it is zero if and
only if X and Y are independent. When two random variables are perfectly correlated,
I (p (x; y))!1. Shannon (1948) prevents mutual information to go to innity by sta-
ting that in any given period, the maximum amount of information about an event X
that can be reliably retrieved through the knowledge of another random event Y using
a communication channel is bounded by a number, that is, the channel capacity. This
means that I (p (x; y))  , where  is the maximum number of bits of information that
the channel can transmit. This seemingly abstract concept has a familiar correspondence
in day-by-day experience: The maximum amount of information that we can download
from our computer cannot exceed a number - the transmission rate- provided by the man-
ufacturer. Likewise, we cannot instantaneously respond to a given E-mail. The amount
of time it takes to respond to an E-mail depends on the content of the E-mail -i.e., initial
uncertainty about the random variable X-, but also on how much information we want
to process about the E-mail in order to produce a sensible response, Y . In the previous
analogy the channel through which we transmit information from the original E-mail to
the reply is our brain. The joint distribution p (x; y) in (10) stands for the information
we need to process about the content of the E-mail having in mind a reply, to make
sure that the mapping between E-mail and reply is as accurate as we want. Finally, the
upper bound on information transmission relates to the capacity of our brain to process
information and to produce an action.
The latter analogy bears the salient elements of rational inattention and its use in
economics. Consider a person who decides how much to consume and work while facing
uncertainty about wages. Had he had innite processing capacity, he would instanta-
neously map information about wages and wealth into an optimal policy for consumption
and labor as in (6). Under information processing constraint à la Shannon, policies such
as (6)-(8) are no longer feasible, for they require processing information at innite rate.
Introducing information processing constraints to the problem implies recognizing that
it takes time and e¤ort to map information about wealth accumulation -that depends
on both savings and labor income, as equation (3) shows- into operative consumption
and labor plans. As replying to an E-mail requires a person to turn attention to its con-
tent, a fortiori deciding labor and consumption with information processing constraints
requires turning attention to current and future possibilities of savings and current and
future possibilities of labor income. Moreover, in both the examples of E-mail and con-
sumption/labor decisions, people choose the information about their state -i.e., E-mail
received in the rst case, wealth in the second case- having in mind how accurate they
want their decision to be -i.e, reply to the E-mail and consumption/labor plans-. Finally,
the accuracy of the reply of the E-mail and consumption/labor plans depends on how
much e¤ort we are willing to make in processing information. In turn, this e¤ort hinges
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on the capacity of the channel -i.e., the brain- as much as the result of trading o¤ of
the cost of processing information for the utility that we derive by writing an adequate
response and having a well specied saving and work policy.
2.2.1 Set up and Timing
I assume that the households in the economy share the same characteristics in terms of
preferences, endowment and their capacity of processing information. This allows me to
focus on a representative agents economy. By assumption, although all the information
is available, it cannot be fully processed by the consumer. This feature of the theory
translates into the assumption that wealth is unknown. The agent enters the world with
a belief about it, b (W ). He chooses a signal that conveys information jointly on his
wealth (W ) and decision (A  fC;Lg) of consumption, C; and work L: Let p (w; a)
denote the joint probability of wealth and decisions implied by the optimal choice of the
signal. Note that the signal can provide information about any dimension of behavior -
A- and wealth - W - that the person wants, with the restriction that the informativeness
of the signal cannot exceed his processing capacity. Such a signal provides him with a
rule of conduct for consumption and labor choices. In period  = 1, the household draw
from the optimal choice p (w; a) his consumption prole (c), and labor supply (l).
Figure 0: A typical day of a rationally inattentive
person.
Then, he observes the outcomes of his choices and use the observation to update rationally
his knowledge of wealth (b (w0ja)). This complete his day. The day after he follows the
same routine starting with b (w0ja) as his new prior. Figure 0 describes the events.
2.3 Statement and Recursive Formulation of ConsumersProb-
lem
I discuss each element of the model in turn, starting from the constraints. First I present
the budget constraint and discuss its role in updating the knowledge of wealth for an
information constrained consumer. Next I turn to the information-ow constraint, key of
the model. Finally I present the objective function and cast the problem into a recursive
formulation.
The structure of the economy follows closely the one of Tutino (2008) to which I
refer for the mathematical details. For completeness, Appendix A proves rigorously that
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the problem admits a recursive formulation and that the resulting Bellman equation is a
contraction.
2.3.1 Budget Constraint and Update
Consumers maximize their lifetime utility function, dened over a consumption good and
leisure. Let C denote the consumption good and L be labor. I collect the actions at time
t in the set At  fCs; Lsgts1.
Consumers are limited in their choices by the budget constraint
Wt+1 = Rt (Wt   Ct) + stLt (11)
where Rt = R is the (constant) interest rate on savings, (Wt   Ct), st is the wage the
agent receives in exchange of Lt units of labor. As in the setting with innite processing
capacity, the process characterizing the wages is a stationary i.i.d. Markov process. Note
that the only source of stochasticity in the model comes from the wage rate, s. Moreover,
people wish to reduce their uncertainty about the linear combination of savings and
labor income as displayed in (11). Since information is fully and freely available, people
can directly acquire signals about the law of motion of wealth although they cannot
observe the exact value of wealth due to information-processing constraints. I assume
that households make their consumption and labor choices knowing that the mean of
the wages is xed at s. This knowledge is embedded in a prior, g (wt) ; over the possible
realizations of wealth. As consumers go through life, they update rationally this belief
with signals on wealth and the observation of their past behaviors.
Let at  fct; ltg be a particular behavior of consumer at time t where ct is a specic
outcome of the random variable C and similarly lt is a specic outcome of the random
variable L. The choice a is drawn from the optimal choice p (w; a).
The posterior of wealth conditional on observing a particular a = ~a follows by Bayes
law :
g0 (w0j~a) =
Z
w
T (w0;w; ~a)  p (wj ~a) dw (12)
where T (w0; :; :) is the transition function commanded by the dynamic of wealth (11) 9
and p (wj ~a) takes into account the potential noise in the current observation of the state.
This noisy observation is carried over one period ahead to infer next periods state.
9Actually, the operator T (w0;w; ~a) assigns probabilities to w0 conditional on the value of ~a and w.
Since current values of w are not observable, the operator T (:) applies an expectation over the unknown
w. For a particular realization of ~a =
n
C = ~c; L = ~l
o
, the operators is dened as:
T (w0;w; ~a)  E (W 0) = R
Z
w
(w   ~c) dw + s~l
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2.3.2 Choice Variable
Before processing any information about wealth (W ), consumption (C) and labor (L) are
random variables from the perspective of the consumers. To see why, rst consider that
the household cannot choose C and L optimally without relating wealth to behavior (C
and L). Coming into the world with a probabilistic knowledge of W , mapping W into C
and L translates into nding a joint relation among wealth, consumption and labor, that
makes the information about wealth as related as possible to consumption and labor.
The selection of information about wealth useful to consumption and labor, that is, the
joint probability distribution of wealth, consumption and labor, p (w; c; l), is key in the
optimization of the consumers since it a¤ects current beliefs and their updates.10
To clarify this point, suppose that information ows at innite rate. In this case, the
optimal p (w; c; l) will be degenerate assigning to each value of w one value for c (w) and
l (w), as in the solution (6)-(8). By contrast, suppose that processing information about
wealth is too di¢ cult for the consumer, then the consumer will be better o¤ processing
very limited amount of information about wealth. This is equivalent to choosing the
minimal amount of information about wealth that allow the consumer to set c and l
constant for each value of w without breaking his budget. Such a behavior implies that
consumption and labor will be almost independent on wealth. When the information-
processing e¤ort lies in between this two extreme cases, optimizing consumers aim at
setting p (w; c; l) such that the conditional probability of wealth given consumption and
labor is as close to wealth as possible given the information constraint and the preference
of the consumers.11
Once consumers choose an optimal policy, p (w; c; l), consumption and labor are
drawn from that distribution.
2.3.3 Information Constraint
As explained before, people with limited processing capacity, select optimally information
about wealth and behavior within their cognitive possibilities. I model the restriction
that these cognitive possibilities are nite using Shannons mutual information.12 between
the random variables W and A. This technology measures the maximum reduction in
uncertainty associated to a system as di¤erence between the initial uncertainty -entropy of
W - and the knowledge of the variableW provided by the observation ofA -i.e., conditional
10Alternatively, one can think of the choice of p (w; c; l) as equivalent to choosing a signal about
wealth and behavior. The consumer decides the scope of the signal according to his preferences but the
overall informativeness of the signal is constrained by his information-processing limits.
11Exploring the interaction between information processing constraints and general specications for
preferences is relatively novel to the literature of rational inattention which has focussed mainly on the
Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) framework (Sims 2003, Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2008a, 2008b).
See Tutino (2009) for a discussion of the advantages of moving into a fully endogenous choice of signals
with respect to the LQG framework.
12See Shannon (1954), Sims (2003, 2006).
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entropy of W given A-. Since mutual information depends only on the joint distribution
of W and A for a given belief, this way of modelling residual uncertainty is applicable
without additional restrictions on the nature and characteristics of the channel. In my
setting, Shannon capacity captures the ability of consumers to interpret news about their
wealth, thereby regulating the speed of reaction of their behavior to these news.
I model peoples ability to map information about wealth into consumption and la-
bor decisions by assuming a constant and exogenous shadow cost on the information-
processing constraint -i.e., mutual information between W and A-.13 In the model, such
a cost is denoted by . This assumption has the interpretation that mapping each bit of
information about wealth into consumption and labor decisions costs the same process-
ing e¤ort to the consumers. Di¤erent from Sims (2003) and Mackowiak and Wiederholt
(2008a) where the capacity is xed and exhausted every period, xing the shadow cost of
processing information has the appealing property that consumers can e¤ectively choose
the amount of uncertainty they want to reduce each period according to their (perceived)
nancial conditions and their preferences. For instance, a person who nds it extremely
costly to process information about wealth -i.e., high -, might choose to pay atten-
tion to wealth only after he observes that his consumption/leisure prole has changed
signicantly over time. By contrast, a person with relative better abilities to process
information -i.e., low -, might nd it optimal to keep close track of his wealth in order
to enjoy combinations of consumption and leisure that maximize his utility.
Formally, let I (p (w; a)) be the mutual information implied by the choice of the joint
distribution ofW and A, (p (w; a)). The constraint that limits the amount of processable
information at each time t is given by :
t = It (p (w; a)) =
Z
p (wt; at) log
 
p (wt; at) R
p ( ~wt; at) d ~wt

g (wt)
!
dwtdat (13)
The expression in (13) says that the maximum uncertainty that the consumer can
reduce about his wealth through observation of consumption and labor supply is at most
 bits per unit of time. Mapping formulae into the intuition from the previous section,
had the consumer had innite processing capacity, he would have been able to choose a
signal which makes each of his actions informative about a particular value of wealth.
This results in a policy function for consumption, labor and wealth that depends on the
-now observable- value of wealth. On the other extreme, with no processing capacity, the
best one can do is to assign all the probability to a particular value of A. This choice
makes the variables W and A independent of each other, (I (p (w; a))! 0). Every day,
such a person spends the same amount of cash in consumption and the same amount
of time working, regardless of his nancial possibilities. In the intermediate case, if the
13Note that having a shadow cost associated to information processing and  = It (p (w; a)) is iso-
morphic to assuming a bound on the maximum amount of capacity while having the constraint holding
with inequality, that is    = It (p (w; a)). The latter approach is adopted by, e.g., Sims (2003) and
Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2008a) while the rst approach is adopted by e.g., Sims (2006) and Tutino
(2009).
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person can process a nite amount of information, he attends to information that make
his saving and labor decisions as related as to wealth as his utility commands and his
information-processing constraint allows.
2.3.4 Objective
Households problem is to maximize the innite horizon expected utility of consumption
and leisure discounted at factor . Let  be the (xed and exogenous) shadow cost of
processing information  in (13). Moreover, let utility be specied by:
u (c; l) = log c  
 + 1
l+1 (14)
where  is the inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply, ", and  2 [0; 1] is a constant
disutility associated to labor.
The control for agents maximization is a signal, p (w; a) that solves : 14
V (g (w)) = max
p(w;a)2D
X
w
X
a
u (c; l) p (w; a) +
 X
w
X
a
(V (g0 (w0ja))) p (w; a)
!
(15)
subject to
 = I (p (w; a)) =
X
w
X
a
p (w; a) log

p (w; a)
(
P
~w p ( ~w; a)) g (w)

(16)
and (12) and the requirement that p (w; a) 2 D where D is the set of all distributions
that satisfy X
a
p ( ~w; a) = g ( ~w) (17)
0  p (w; a)  1, 8 (w; a) (18)X
w
X
a
p (w; a) = 1: (19)
In addition (3) and (5) are imposed.
Taking rst order condition with respect to p (w; a) results in 15
14For a formal prove that the innite problem of the household can be written as a Bellman equation
see Appendix A.
15Note that the rst order condition in (20) is valid for  > 0. If  = 0, then the probabilities g (w)
and p (w; a) are degenerate. In this case, I (p (w; a)) = 0, and using Fanos inequality (Thomas and
Cover 1991),
c (I (p (w; a))) = c (w)
l (I (p (w; a))) = l (w)
which makes the rst order conditions for this case the full information solutions (6)-(8).
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@p (w; a) :
0 = u (c; l) + V (ja) + 
 
log

p (w; a)P
w
00 p (w00 ; a)

 
X
w
X
a
p (w; a)
@
 P
w00
 
w
00
; a

@ (p (w; a))
!
+
 X
w
X
a
"
@
 
V
 
g0
 
w0jat

@g
 
w0jat
 @g (w0ja)
@p (w; a)
#
p (w; a)
!
(20)
where
@g
 
w0jat

@p (w; a)
=
@ (
P
w T (w
0jw; a) p (wj a))
@p (w; a)
=
X
w
T (w0jw; a)P
a00 p (w; a00) ~p (a)
+
X
w
@T (w0jw; a)
@p (w; a)
p (wj a) :
Dene the solution to the optimization problem of the consumers as the distribu-
tion p (w; a). The realized outcomes fct; ltg are then drawn from the optimal joint
p (w; c; l). Appendix B derives the solution of a static, low-dimensional version of
problem (15)-(19) that admits a quasi analytical solution.
3 Solution Strategy
The computation methodology follows closely Tutino (2009) to which I refer for technical
details. However, there is a computational di¤erence on the construction of the simplex
that I shall highlight. This paper uses a uniform random grid to generate the simplex.
Such a method is more e¢ cient in terms of computational time than a non-uniform
random grid and it requires less point to span the simplex. To sketch the methodology,
we start with n as the number of possible values that w can assume. Then, each point of
the simplex, , is an n array each of whose rows contains m random values belonging
to the interval [0; 1]. The distribution of values is uniform in the sense that it has the
conditional probability distribution of a uniform distribution over the whole m-cube,
given that the sum per row is 1: The algorithm randomly determines the placement of
random points in the n  1 dimensional simplexes.
To map the ner state space into Matlab possibilities, I interpolate the value function
with the new values of (12) using a kernel regression of V () into g0 (w0ja) : I use an
Epanechnikov kernel with smoothing parameter h = 3.16 For the partition on wealth, I
choose an evenly spaced grid with 20 points where w takes values in [1; ::; 10]. Similarly,
the partitions on c and l have 20 points each and take values in [0:53; ::; 5:3] and [1; ::; 6]
respectively.17 The value iteration converges in about 220 iterations.
16The reason why I choose h = 3 comes from experimental trials for h 2 [2; 5] with increments of
0:5 (i:e:; h = 2; h = 2:5; ::). While the results do not change substatially as I vary h in this range, the
computational time is lower when I set h = 3.
17This discretization makes the joint distribution per simplex point a 400  20 matrix.
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Table 1 reports the benchmark parameter values.
Benchmark V alues
Discretization
s 1.2
 1.1
 1
 1
R 1.02
Discount Factor,  0.98
Table 1
In the calibration in Table 1, I assume that R = 1 and log utility of consumption
( ! 1). These two parametrization jointly imply consumersdesire to smooth con-
sumption throughout their lifetime. Also, the benchmark model has Frisch elasticity of
substitution equal to 1. Such a parametrization of Frisch elasticity is commonly used in
the literature18 and roughly consistent with macro evidence on labor supply elasticity.
The specication of the preferences in the benchmark case implies that utility is concave
and increasing in consumption and concave and decreasing in labor.
4 Predictions of the Model
The goal of this section is to provide suggestive evidence on how the model performs
when compared to U.S. data. The data that I use for consumption are non durable
goods from the Bureau of Economic Analysis while data for average hours worked are
available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. I present two sets of results in order
to relate the predictions of the model to cyclical as well as secular movements of labor,
consumption, wealth and wages. With respect to cyclical movements, I focus on a set
of business cycle facts regarding consumption, labor and their volatility, persistence and
comovement. The business cycle data have quarterly frequency from 1964.I to 2007.II.
With respect to secular movements, I analyze the long-run consequences of changes in
wages for consumption and labor supply.
4.1 Business Cycle Facts through Shannons lenses.
I construct gures and statistics by de-trending the data with the HP lter, using a
value of  = 1600. I then used the detrended data to compute mean, standard deviation
and correlations. I compare the results of the model with the detrended series under
the observation that processing information through a Shannon channel lters out high
frequency component of the variable(s) of interest (see Guo et al. (2005), Verdù (1996,
18See Shimer (2009) and references therein.
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1999) and Sims (1998, 2003). The choice of HP lter over other lters is simply to ease
the comparison with the business cycle literature.
As for the simulated series, I dene a model as a set M = f; ; g and I compare
the business cycle facts to specications of the model that assume  = 2; 0:2; 0:02;  = 1
and  = 1. I choose three values of  as a proxy for three types of individuals that face
three di¤erent shadow costs of processing information ranging from low ( = 0:02) to
medium ( = 0:2) to high ( = 2). The choice of these particular numerical values can
be explained as follows. I verify empirically that given the discretization of core states
and core decisions and the baseline model with log utility of consumption and concave
disutility in labor, a value of  between 1 and 3 leads to the same quantitative results in
terms of choice of distribution. Thus, I pick the middle value in the set  2 [1; 3) for the
high shadow cost of information-processing. The optimal choice of the joint distribution
p (w; a) is similar for value of  2 (0:1; 0:6]. Again, I pick the middle value in the interval
for the second choice of . Similar reasonings conduct to  = 0:02 as lower value of 
when  takes up values in (0:01; 0:05). Notice that for values of  above 5, households
acquire very little information about wealth and set consumption and labor basically
constant. Also, values of  below 0:05 deliver a solution very close to the full information
case.
To get a quantitative assessment of what these shadow costs mean in terms of loss in
utility, I compute the average di¤erence in lifetime utility between the innite capacity
case and each of the -cases considered. That is, I set u (c; l) = log (c) (= ( + 1)) l+1
and I compute E
 
u (c; l)  u  cI ; lI ;  where E (u (c; l)) is average lifetime utility under
innite capacity case whileE
 
u
 
cI ; lI ; 

is the utility under a particular value of  when
 takes values in (f2g ; f0:2g ; f0:02g). With an average value of E (u (c; l)) ' 1:6 under
full information,  = 2 is associated to a loss of about 22% in lifetime utility,  = 0:2
implies a loss of about 11% while  = 0:02 delivers a loss of about 6%. The values used
for this computation can be found in Table 10a  10c in appendix B. I assume that the
economy is populated evenly by those three types.19
The computations are as follows. For each , mean, standard deviation and correlation
of the simulated series are calculated after I take averages of 10; 000Monte Carlo runs and
simplex points. The statistics for each of this series are in Tables 10a   10c. In tables
10d   10f the same methodology produces the results for the cases M = f0:2; 3; 1g ;
M = f0:2; 1; 4g and M = f0:2; 1; :25g. The results for the simulated series in Tables
2-4 and Table 6 are calculated by computing an arithmetic average of the series just
described for  = 2; 0:2; 0:02. I do not lter out low frequency variations in the solution
paths generated by the model since there are no exogenous shocks at high frequency. I
refer to the business cycle facts occurring between 1964.I and 2007.II as BC and to the
rational inattention predictions with consumption and labor as RI .
19As it is possible to see from the statistics for each  in Table 10a-10f in Appendix B, the main results
do not change signicantly if instead of having an average of the results across , I assume an average
value of .
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4.1.1 BC Fact 1: The ratio of standard deviations of consumption and hours
is 1.31
The model predicts excess volatility of consumption with respect to labor supply. This
result depends on the bound of information-processing capacity and its interplay with
risk aversion and disutility of labor. Consider a consumer with log utility in consumption
and Frisch labor supply elasticity equal to 1. Had the household had innite capacity,
he would have chosen to smooth consumption by varying labor supply. With positive
and nite information-processing capacity, he does not track wealth perfectly at high fre-
quency. He selects a signal about wealth and changes labor and consumption according
to the information content of the signal. Willing to smooth consumption, the household
rationally chooses to save and work hard while he accumulates information about his -
nancial possibilities. Once he realizes that he is rich, he increases consumption. However,
to maintain a relatively high consumption prole for prolonged time, he keeps working
hard. If he has accumulated too much savings -due to low informativeness of period by
period signals- when the variation in consumption occurs is sizeable. Furthermore, such
variation would be bigger than the one of labor to avoid taking risks on future wealth.
Table 2 compares the modelM (; 1; 1)  1
3
(M (2; 1; 1) +M (0:2; 1; 1) +M (0:02; 1; 1))
to U.S. data. The mean of the wages is constant throughout the simulation at 1:2.
US Business Cycle : Quarterly Data (1964.I-2007.II), HP lter, , %
Std.Dev
Non Dur. Consumption(C) 0.84
Hours (L) 0.64
Simulated Data, average across models
Std.Dev
Consumption (c) 0.88
Labor (l) 0.66
Table 2: Statistical properties of US Business Cycle and Model
The rst nding of the model, parallel to BC 1, is:
RC Finding 1. For the model M (; 1; 1), the standard deviation of consumption over
labor is 1.33. The volatility is higher the higher the shadow cost of information is.
Moreover, the higher the shadow cost of information, the more sluggish consumption
and labor are with sudden adjustment following accumulation of wealth. This joint
behavior of consumption and labor is responsible for the high volatility of the two
series.
4.1.2 BC Fact 2: Non durable consumption and hours have 1st order serial
correlation higher than 80%
In the model, consumption and labor are more persistent the lower the information ow.
In the latter case, it occurs also that contemporaneous consumption and labor lag wealth.
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Figure 1: Sample Path of consumption and labor. Average across 10,000 Monte Carlo runs, M=f;1;1g:
The intuition for these ndings lies on the mechanism through which consumers up-
date their knowledge of wealth, expressed in (12). Each period they choose a signal on
wealth, decide consumption and labor based on the information from the signal and,
given their choices, update their knowledge of wealth. The higher the processing cost,
the less informative the signal. This in turn means that most of the update derives from
the observations of past values of consumption and labor. As wealth accumulates, the
signal consistently reports high values of wealth. This information triggers a reaction
in behavior. The process leads to both delayed response to uctuations of wealth and
strong autocorrelation between current and past values of consumption and labor.
The comparison between models ndings and data is in Table 3.
US Business Cycle : Quarterly Data (1964.I-2007.II), HP lter, %
Autocorr
Non Durable Goods(C) 93
Average Hours (L) 88
Simulated Data, average across models
Autocorr
Consumption (c) 92
Labor (l) 87
Table 3: Statistical properties of US Business Cycle and Model
The counterpart for BC Fact 2 in the model can be summarized as:
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RC Finding 2. For the model M (; 1; 1), the autocorrelation of consumption and labor
are above 80%.
4.1.3 BC Fact 3: The contemporaneous correlation of consumption and
hours is 78%.
US Business Cycle : Cross-Correlation, (1964.I-2007.II),HP, %
C ( 1) C L ( 1) L
C 0.93 1 0.77 0.78
L 0.66 0.78 0.88 1
Table 4:BC Fact 3
The model nds a strong comovement of labor and consumption. It also predicts a
strong correlation between contemporaneous consumption and wealth when information
ow is high. The reason for a strong relationship among contemporaneous values of
wealth, labor and consumption in the model is twofold. First, the variables are related
through the budget constraint (11) which is used by consumers to update their prior on
wealth. Second, the optimal policy of the consumer delivers a tight link among these
variables since it is the stationary joint distribution between choices (consumption and
labor) and state (wealth).
Simulated Data: Cross-Correlation
c ( 1) c l ( 1) l
c 0.88 1 0.73 0.81
l 0.61 0.81 0.84 1
Table 5: Cross-correlation of consumption and labor. Average across 10,000 Monte Carlo runs, M=f;1;1g
Table 5 and 6 show the comovement of labor and consumption and wealth, labor and
consumption, respectively. While the fact that these variables are strongly correlated
is robust, the size and sign of the correlation depend on the interaction between utility
and information cost. As Table 10d in Appendix B shows, for a given shadow cost and
disutility of labor, the higher the coe¢ cient of risk aversion the higher the correlation
between contemporaneous consumption and wealth. This result occurs because people
that are relative more risk averse gather more information about wealth before changing
their behavior than less risk averse people do. The reason is that people with high risk
aversion want to avoid consuming too little when wealth is high.20 Thus, they react to
negative changes in wealth by varying labor supply and increase consumption in response
to positive changes. If one is to x the shadow cost and CRRA-coe¢ cient, , and to
increase Frisch elasticity of labor supply -from " = 1 to " = 4 or  = 0:25 in Table 10e in
Appendix B-, then the contemporaneous correlation of labor and wealth increases while
correlation between consumption and labor as well as the contemporaneous correlation
between consumption and wealth decreases. The rationale for this result lies in the
20See Tutino (2009).
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interaction between preferences and information constraint. People with high Frisch
elasticity of labor supply acquire more information than people with relatively low Frisch
elasticity -see Table 10f -. They do so because they want their labor supply to track
closely wealth in order to prevent uctuations of wealth to a¤ect consumption. Thus,
people with high Frisch elasticity trade o¤ utils of consumption and leisure for being well
informed about wealth uctuations and, in turn, they are able to achieve a higher utility
than people with low elasticity since they can maintain consumption constant throughout
their lifetime -a desirable feature given the log utility of consumption-.
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Figure 2: Sample Path of consumption and Wealth. Average across 10,000 Monte Carlo runs, M=f;1;1g
The reason why lagged value of wealth are highly correlated with contemporaneous
consumption comes from the interaction between the curvature of the utility function
and the shadow cost of information. Concave utility together with high information cost
trigger a conservative consumption prole and a consistent increase in consumption when
the signal conveys information about high value of wealth (cfr. RC Finding 1).
With low elasticity of labor supply, the strong and positive comovement of consump-
tion and labor (RC Finding 2) makes labor react in a way similar to consumption. When
the elasticity of labor supply increases, people try to balance consumption smoothing
and increase in leisure with the information available on wealth. The result is a weaker
positive correlation of behavior and current and lagged values of wealth .
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Cross-Correlation for Wealth
w ( 1) w
c 0.73 0.61
l 0.68 0.58
w 0.73 1
Table 6: Cross correlation of wealth; average across Mf; =1;=1g
The third fact from the model is:
RC Finding 3. For the model M (; 1; 1) the contemporaneous cross correlation be-
tween consumption and labor is 0.81%. Moreover, consumption and labor are more
correlated to lagged values of wealth than contemporaneous values of wealth.
4.2 Growth Facts
Figures 3a-3b plot the response of labor and consumption to a 10% change in wage for
the model (solid lines) as well as the innite information equivalent (black dashed line).
Both changes are assumed to occur in period t = 1 and they are known at t = 0. Figure
3a displays the responses of consumption and labor to a permanent change in wage, while
Figure 3b show the responses of consumption and labor to a temporary change in wealth
of the same amount.
The top panels of gure 3a present the impulse response for aggregate consumption
(top right panel) and labor (top left panel). The bottom panels of gure 3a show responses
of consumption (bottom right panel) and labor (bottom left panel) for individuals with
3 values of shadow costs of information constraint, i.e.,  = 2 (green solid-star line),
 = 0:2 (blue solid line) and  = 0:02 (magenta dotted-dashed line), together with the
corresponding series with innite information (black dashed line).
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Figure 3a. Impulse response function for a permanent 10% change in wage: consumption (rst column) and labor (second column)
Consider the impulse response of consumption and labor for di¤erent values of 
(bottom panel). Under innite information capacity, i.e.,  = 0, consumption jumps
quickly to its new steady state value while labor initially increases to sustain a higher
level of consumption (wealth e¤ect). Once consumption reaches its new higher value,
the substitution e¤ect commands a decrease in hours worked up until the household
goes back to the work e¤ort he had before the shocks. With shadow cost of processing
information  = 0:2, people acknowledge the change in wealth slowly and cautiously
increase both consumption and labor. As they wait to fully adjust their behavior to the
increase in wages, their savings accumulate. Signals that wealth creeps up get stronger by
the increase in savings and the increase in labor. Hence, type- = 0:2 react to the those
signal by moving consumption permanently up and slowly decreasing work e¤ort. Note
that the initial increase in work e¤ort more than compensates for a permanently higher
consumption. As a result, the steady state value of hours worked is lower than it was
without the change in wealth. This mechanism is amplied for  = 2. In such a case, due
to a low ow of information, these types are reluctant to change their behavior in response
to the change in wealth. Such a reluctance results in more savings and, ultimately
higher steady state consumption and higher hours worked with respect to the case with
 = 0:2. Aggregating these types (top panels), when wages changes permanently, the
model obtains a long run increase while the e¤ect on labor is muted. This nding is
consistent with secular patterns in U.S. data: in the long run, wages and consumption
grow steady at about the same rate while movements in per capita hours are negligible.
Consider Figure 3b. It shows a temporary 10% change in wage. The rst column
of gure 3b shows impulse response functions for aggregate consumption (top panel)
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and individual consumption (bottom panel) when  = 2 (green solid-star line),  = 0:2
(blue solid line) and  = 0:02 . The second column of gure 3b plots the corresponding
impulse response for labor. In all the four pictures the black dashed line indicates impulse
responses under the innite information solution.
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Figure 3b. Impulse response function for a temporary 10% change in wage: consumption (rst column) and labor (second column)
The impulse response for consumption and labor in the innite information solution
(black dashed line) show an initial increase in consumption and labor followed by a
sudden decrease in hours worked while consumption reaches its new steady state. The
model for  = 0:2 (blue solid line, bottom panels) predicts that consumption grows slowly
following the shock to wage and so does labor supply. Accumulation of savings due to an
increase in labor e¤ort allows consumption to achieve an higher long run value. While
consumption stabilizes to its new steady state level, substitution e¤ect prevails and type
 = 0:2 increases leisure, ending up to a new steady state value slightly lower than the
one he enjoyed before the change in wage. People with  = 0:02 follows the same patterns
as people with innite processing constraint. However the e¤ects of the temporary shock
is much more persistent than in the full information case. People with  = 2 adjust
their consumption and labor decision very slowly to the temporary shock. The logic
of this result is akin to the one used for the permanent shock: income e¤ect kicks in
slowly due to low information ow and while people fail to react to the increase in wages
they accumulate savings. Once people acknowledge the increase in savings, they adjust
consumption so to keep it smooth from then on -recall that people have log utility-. At
this point, the substitution e¤ect prevails and people start enjoying more leisure. The
aggregate impulse responses (top panels) conrm these patterns.
Studying the e¤ect of a change in wage over the long run leads to the fourth nding
of the paper:
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RC Finding 4. For the model M (; 1; 1) the long run e¤ects of an increase in wages
are: (1) a signicant increase in consumption, (2) a negligible increase in hours
worked. The e¤ect on consumption are more pronounced the lower the information
ow. The transitional dynamics of consumption and labor in the model have much
more endogenous persistence compared to the innite information case.
5 Optimal conditional distribution
Figures 4a and 4b show the optimal conditional distribution of consumption and labor21
respectively for a given value of wealth - w = 1, top panel w = 4, medium panel and
w = 8, bottom panel- and two values of the shadow cost of information processing -
 = 0:2, blue bars, and  = 2, solid green line-. The gures plot the optimal conditional
distribution for a given simplex point.22 Consider rst the optimal conditional distribu-
tion of consumption when wealth is low -Figure 4a, top panel-. For w = 1, the optimal
signal acquired by a person with relatively high information ow - = 0:2, blue bars in
the picture- places high probability mass on low values of consumption ( c = 0:7) but he
also allows for the possibility of higher consumption - c = 2:3 and c = 3:1- sustained by
labor income. In fact, as the top panel of Figure 4b shows, the optimal distribution of
labor conditional to w = 1 for a person with  = 0:2 places more than 60% probability
on values of hours worked above the median level - l = 3:5 - of the support of labor.
By contrast, when wealth is high -w = 8, bottom panel in Figure 4a and 4b- the agent
with  = 0:2 assigns high probability to high values of consumption -c = 5:1-. Note that
although the agent reduces his labor e¤ort with respect to the case w = 1, he still places
more than 40% of probability of working at and above the median value for hours so
that he can maintain high value of consumption with labor income and savings. For a
medium value of wealth, w = 4, the agent with  = 0:2 assigns most of the probability
mass to values of consumption between 2 and 3. However, the agent assigns also positive
-even if small- probability to high value of consumption -c = 5:5 with probability 0:02-
counting on nancing consumption expenditures through labor income. Also, for this
type of agent, choices of labor are focussed on the medium values of the support with a
21The optimal conditional distributions plotted in Figures 4a and 4b are calculated as follows. For a
given value of wealth, w = w, the optimal conditional distribution of consumption is:
p (cjw) =
X
l2L
p (c; ljw)
where p (c; ljw) comes from the solution of the optimization problem (15)-(19) and L is the set of
possible values that labor, l, assumes. A similar expression holds for p ( ljw) :
22In Appendix B, the values reported for the statistcs of consumption, labor, wealth and information
ow are average across simplex-points.
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peak at l = 2:8 whose probability is 0:42:
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
P(C| w=1)
p(
c|
w
)
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5
0
0.2
0.4
P(C| w=4)
p(
c|
w
)
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
P(C| w=8)
Consumption values
p(
c|
w
)
q=0.2
q=2
Figure 4a: Optimal conditional distribution of consumption for =0:2 (bar) and =2 (line)
Now consider an agent with the same preferences as the previous one but higher
shadow costs of processing capacity, i.e.,  = 2. By looking at gures 4a and 4b, it is
evident that people with  = 2 have more spread distributions of consumption and labor
than their  = 0:2 counterpart. The noisier behavior of their labor and consumption
is due to the fact that people with  = 2 have a lower reduction in uncertainty about
wealth than people with  = 0:2. Thus, their optimal probability is less informative than
that of types  = 0:2. For instance, consider the conditional distribution of consumption
and labor when wealth is high, w = 8. The person with  = 2 places higher probability
on low values of consumption than the person with  = 0:2 does.
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Figure 4b: Optimal conditional distribution of labor for =0:2 (bar) and =2 (line)
As tables 10a-10b in Appendix B reveal, the expected values23 of consumption and
labor for a person with  = 0:2 is 3:95 with variance 1:10 for consumption and 2:68
and 1:06 for labor. A person with  = 2 enjoys on average 3:55 units of consumption
with variance 1:79 and works an average of 3:05 hours with variance 1:52. The average
information ow is 1:08 bits for an individual with  = 0:2 and 0:73 bits for a person
with the same preferences as the previous one but with  = 2.
5.1 Robustness
Tables 10d   10f show the relationship between risk aversion, ; Frisch elasticity of
substitution, 1=, and shadow cost of information, . As table 10d shows, for a given
 and elasticity of substitution, the higher the coe¢ cient of risk aversion , the higher
the mean and the lower the variance of consumption. This nding makes intuitive sense
since a risk averse household would save a lot during the early stages of life to enjoy
high consumption later on due to the accumulated savings. Savings come from both
low consumption and high labor supply at early stages of life triggered by the fear of
running out of wealth. Once consumers realize they have built a su¢ cient bu¤er to cover
for consumption and leisure expenses, they increase consumption and reduce -though by
a lower extent- labor supply. The peak in consumption for these types of households
23All the statistics in Appendix B are evaluated as average across simplex points, e.g. :
E (C) =
X
i
0@X
j
X
k
ck  [p (ckjwj) gi (wj)]
1A
where gi (w) is a single simplex point.
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occur later in their lifetime and labor supply is higher at the beginning than it is later
on. Thus, information costs enhance precautionary savings. For a given  and , a
lower the Frisch elasticity of substitution (from  = 0:25 to  = 4 in tables 10e and
10f; respectively) generates lower mean and lower variances for both consumption and
labor. Keeping the degree of risk aversion xed, a low elasticity of substitution for labor
supply increases the income e¤ect over the substitution e¤ect. However, the presence
of information processing constraint still favors substitution e¤ect mitigating the income
e¤ect. If the signal on wealth is very noisy, consumers supply more labor than they would
do in the case of perfect information and  = 4, since they are not certain that their
wealth is actually decreasing. When the information collected signals that the wealth has
been increased, labor supply suddenly decreases. The opposite occurs when consumers
receive more and more information about a decrease in wealth.
To get a sense on how the shadow cost of information a¤ects consumption and labor
behaviors when the Frisch elasticity of substitution goes to innity, consider M () 
f; ( ! 1;  = 0)g where  = 2; 0:2; 0:02: The rst observation is that as the informa-
tion costs increases, average consumption, labor and information ow decrease, while
the standard deviations of these series increases. This is also true for wealth. These
results are intuitive. Under full information, the characteristics of the utility function
( ! 1) command a consumption prole smooth throughout their life-time. Moreover,
with innite Frisch elasticity of substitution, ( i.e.,  = 0) labor supply adjusts according
to wealth uctuations to accommodate consumption smoothing. When information ows
at nite rate, rational households choose signals about wealth with the same purpose.
If processing-information has low cost,  = 0:02, consumers can choose a signal about
wealth informative enough to allow them to use labor supply to smooth uctuations in
wealth and, in turn, consumption. On the other hand, if information is costly,  = 2,
consumers keep track of wealth slowly and, as a consequence, modify consumption and
labor sporadically. When they do change their behavior, they do so by a signicant
amount. The resulting path for wealth inherits the higher variance of consumption and
labor and, on average, has higher mean than in the previous case due to the increase in
savings in periods of inertial behavior. A sample path of consumption under di¤erent
0s-scenarios is in Figure 5.
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Comparing consumption for u(c;l)=log(c) l
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Figure 5: Sample path of consumption for di¤erent s.
Figure 6 conrms the intuition that consumption is smoother the lower information
costs are. Consumers with  = 0:02 save at the beginning of the simulated period to enjoy
high level of consumption later on. By contrast, consumers with  = 2 track with di¢ -
culties their wealth and this is reected in a prolonged period of savings while processing
information about wealth. This behavior results into slow and sizeable adjustments of
consumption during the simulated period. One point worth attention is the existence of
precautionary savings generated by information ow constraints. Individuals with less
processing capacity ( = 2) push forward an increase in consumption more than the other
people ( = 0:2 and  = 0:02) do. Types  = 2 acknowledge the accumulation of wealth
due to the additional savings later in the simulation. This forces them to increase their
consumption for a short period of time at the end of the simulation period.
Given the strong correlation between consumption and labor and the preferences of
the individuals, it is not surprising that people with  = 0:02 work harder at the beginning
of the simulation to nance their consumption, though they manage to enjoy some leisure
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at the end of the simulation (see Figure 7).
Comparing consumption and labor for u(c;l)=log(c) 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Figure 6: Time path consumption and labor, various 
Correlation between consumption and labor is higher the higher the information costs.
The intuition for this result is that the reaction of both consumption and labor behaviors
to accumulation of wealth are delayed by individuals capacity of processing information.
As they have better knowledge of how much wealth they have, they review both plans.
People actions are mirrored in wealth accumulation. Individuals with  = 0:02 build
up savings at the beginning of the period to dissave gradually later on. This is akin to
29
consumption smoothing under full information.
Comparing consumption(blue) and wealth (red) for u(c;l)=log(c) l
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Figure 7: Time path wealth and consumption, log-lin utility, various 
People who are more constrained in their choice of signals, adjust with delays con-
sumption to uctuations in wealth. Such delays smooth consumption while consumers
are processing information but at the same time, call for major adjustments afterwards.
Note also how consumption and labor lag wealth for  = 2: The cross-correlation coe¢ -
cients between lagged wealth and current consumption is 0:65 while the contemporaneous
correlation is only 0:47. A similar result holds for labor and lagged values of wealth. This
nding is also consistent with intuition. Every period households receive little informa-
tion about their wealth and rely on past values of consumption and labor to update their
knowledge. While waiting, wealth accumulates and so does information until the con-
sumers are convinced to change their behavior. This mechanism implies that behavioral
response to movement in wealth is lagged. Finally, Figures 5-7 (together with Figures
8-11 in Appendix B) illustrate also the high persistence of the series documented in the
previous section forM ()  f; ( ! 1;  = 1)g whose statistics are in Tables 10a  10c.
Not surprisingly, the persistence is higher the higher the information cost is.
6 Conclusions
I presented a model in which rational households optimize their lifetime utility under
information-processing constraint à la Sims. I show that such a model, even in its sim-
plicity, is able to replicate many empirical regularities of U.S. business cycle data as well
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as secular movements: higher volatility of consumption with respect to labor, persistence
and strong comovement of consumption and employment, lagged response of consumption
and labor with respect to wealth. Following a temporary as well as permanent increase
in wages, the model produces a permanent increase in consumption and no signicant
changes in the long run growth of labor supply. Consistent with the empirical evidence,
in the model the e¤ects of a shock to wage spread out slowly through time. The main
source behind the persistence of such a shock to wage is consumersendogenous choice
of information. When households face information-processing constraints, they select
signals on their wealth and make consumption and labor decisions based on those sig-
nals. Each period, wealth evolves because of savings which depends on consumption and
income. The latter in turn depends on labor supply and an exogenous stochastic wage
whose distribution is xed and known. Since movements in income a¤ect the growth
of wealth and consumers keep track of it by signals, the less informative the signals,
the more persistent their choices. Once wealth accumulates and households acknowledge
this growth through information collected, they change their behavior consistently. These
predictions of the model are consistent with secular movements in labor and consump-
tion in the U.S with long run per capita consumption exhibiting steady growth whereas
per capita hours worked showing negligible growth. Moreover, the same mechanism is
able to capture persistence and lags of the main macroeconomic variables over the U.S.
business cycle. The ndings of the paper suggest that making a leap to a fully rational
inattention setting is worth the computational e¤ort. For it gets us closer to understand
and interpret empirical regularities in the U.S. data than the current theoretical macro
literature.
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7 Appendix A: Bellman Recursion and its properties
This appendix follow closely the work of Tutino(2008). It establishes the main properties
of the Bellman recursion in the discrete Rational Inattention consumption-labor model.
7.1 The Bellman Recursion is a Contraction Mapping.
Proposition 1. For the discrete Rational Inattention consumption labor value recursion
H and two given functions V and U , it holds that
jjHV  HU jj   jjV   U jj ;
with 0   < 1 and jj:jj the supreme norm. That is, the value recursion H is a
contraction mapping.
Proof. The H mapping displays:
HV (g) = max
p
HpV (g) ;
with
HpV (g) =
"X
w2W
 X
a2A
u (c; l) p (ajw)
!
g (w)  + 
X
w2W
X
a2A
(V (g0a ())) p (ajw) g (w)
#
:
Suppose that jjHV  HU jj is the maximum at point g. Let p1 denote the optimal control
for HV under g and p2 the optimal one for HU
HV (g) = Hp1V (g) ;
HU (g) = Hp2U (g) :
Then it holds
jjHV (g) HU (g)jj = Hp1V (g) Hp2U (g) :
Suppose WLOG that HV (g)  HU (g) : Since p1 maximizes HV at g , I get
Hp2V (g)  Hp1V (g) :
Hence,
jjHV  HU jj =
jjHV (g) HU (g)jj =
Hp1V (g) Hp2U (g) 
Hp2V (g) Hp2U (g) =

X
w2W
X
a2A
[(V p2 (g0a ()))  (Up2 (g0a ()))] p2g (w) 

X
w2W
X
a2A
(jjV   U jj) p2g (w) 
 jjV   U jj :
Recalling that 0   < 1 completes the proof.
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7.2 The Bellman Recursion is an Isotonic Mapping
Corollary For the discrete Rational Inattention consumption-laving value recursion H
and two given functions V and U , it holds that
V  U =) HV  HU
that is the value recursion H is an isotonic mapping.
Proof. Let p1 denote the optimal control for HV under g and p2 the optimal one for
HU
HV (g) = Hp1V (g) ;
HU (g) = Hp2U (g) :
By denition,
Hp1U (g)  Hp2U (g) :
From a given g, it is possible to compute g0a ()jp1 for an arbitrary c and then the following
will hold
V  U =)
8g (w) ; c;
V

g0c ()jp1

 U

g0c ()jp1

=)X
a2A
V

g0a ()jp1

 p1g 
X
a2A
U

g0a ()jp1

 p1g =)
X
w2W
 X
a2A
u (c; l) p1
!
g (w) + 
X
a2A
V

g0a ()jp1

 p1g

X
w2W
 X
a2A
u (c; l) p1
!
=)
Hp1V (g)  Hp1U (g) =)
Hp1V (g)  Hp2U (g) =)
HV (g)  HU (g) =)
HV  HU:
Note that g was chosen arbitrarily and, from it, g0a ()jp1 completes the argument that
the value function is isotone.
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7.3 The Optimal Value Function is Piecewise Linear
Proposition 2. If the utility is CRRA or LOG with a parameter of risk aversion  2
(0;+1) and inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply  2 [0;+1) and if Pr
(aj; wi) satises (16)-(19), then the optimal n   step value function Vn (g) can be
expressed as:
Vn (g) = maxfingi
X
i
n (wi) g (wi)
where the   vectors,  : W ! R, are jW j  dimensional hyperplanes.
Proof. The proof is done via induction. I assume that all the operations are well-
dened in their corresponding spaces. Let   be the set that contains constraints (16)-(19)
.For planning horizon n = 0, I have only to take into account the immediate expected
rewards and thus I have that:
V0 (g) = max
p2 
"X
w2W
 X
a2A
u (c; l) p
!
g (w)
#
(21)
and therefore if I dene the vectors

i0 (w)
	
i

 X
a2A
u (c; l) p
!
p2 
(22)
I have the desired
V0 (g) = maxfi0(w)gi


i0; g

(23)
where h:; :i denotes the inner product hi0; gi 
X
w2W
i0 (w) ; g (w). For the general case,
using equation (??):
Vn (g) = max
p2 
26664
X
w2W
 X
a2A
u (c; l) p (c; ljw)
!
g (w)+
+
X
w2W
X
a2A
(Vn 1 (g0a ()a)) p (c; ljw) g (w)
37775 (24)
by the induction hypothesis
Vn 1 (g ()ja) = maxfin 1gi


in 1; g
0
a ()

(25)
Plugging into the above equation (??) and by denition of h:; :i ,
Vn 1 (g0a ()) = maxfin 1gi
X
w02W
in 1 (w
0)
 X
w2W
X
a2A
T (;w; c; l) Pr (w; c; l)
Pr (c; l)
!
(26)
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With the above:
Vn (g) = max
p2 
266664
X
w2W
 X
a2A
u (c; l) p
!
g (w)+
+maxfin 1gi
X
w02W
in 1 (w
0)
 X
w2W
 X
a2A
T (;w;c;l)
Pr(c;l)
 p
!
g (w)
!
377775
= max
p2 
"
hu (c; l)  p; g (w)i+ 
X
a2A
1
Pr (c; l)
max
fin 1gi
*X
w02W
in 1 (w
0)T (;w; c; l)  p; g
+#
(27)
At this point, it is possible to dene
jp;a (w) =
X
w02W
in 1 (w
0)T ( : w; c; l)  p: (28)
Note that these hyperplanes are independent on the prior g for which I am computing
Vn: Thus, the value function amounts to
Vn (g) = max
p2 
"
hu (c; l)  p; gi+ 
X
a2A
1
Pr (c; l)
max
fjp;ag
j


jp;a; g
#
; (29)
and dene:
p;a;g = arg maxfjp;ag
j


jp;a; g

: (30)
Note that p;a;g is a subset of jp;a and using this subset results into
Vn (g) = max
p2 
"
hu (c; l)  p; gi+ 
X
a2A
1
Pr (c; l)
hp;a;g; gi
#
= max
p2 
*
u (c; l) +
X
a2A
1
Pr (c; l)
p;a;g; g
+
: (31)
Now 
in
	
i
=
[
8g
(
u (c; l)  p+ 
X
a2A
1
Pr (c; l)
p;a;g
)
p2 
(32)
is a nite set of linear function parametrized in the action set.
7.4 .. and Convex (PCWL)
Proposition 3. Assuming the CRRA or LOG utility function and the conditions of
Proposition 1, let V0 be an initial value function that is piecewise linear and convex.
Then the ith value function obtained after a nite number of update steps for a
rational inattention consumption-saving problem is also nite, piecewise linear and
convex (PCWL).
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Proof. The rst task is to prove that fingi sets are discrete for all n. The proof
proceeds via induction. Assuming CRRA/LOG utility and since the optimal policy
belongs to  , it is straightforward to see that through (22), the set of vectors fi0gi,

i0
	
i

 X
w2W
 X
a2A

c1 
1     
l1+
1 + 

p (c; ljw)
!
g (w)
!
p2 
is discrete. For the general case, observe that for discrete controls and assuming M =jn 1	, the sets jp;c	 are discrete, for a given action p and consumption c, I can only
generate jp;c vectors. Now, xing p it is possible to select one of theM jp;c vectors for
each one of the observed consumption c and, thus, fjngi is a discrete set. The previous
proposition, shows the value function to be convex. The piecewise-linear component of
the properties comes from the fact that fjngi set is of nite cardinality. It follows that
Vn is dened as a nite set of linear functions.
8 Appendix B : Model Statistics and Graphs
8.1 Tables
 = 2; f = 1;  = 1g
Mean St.Dev
Consumption (c) 3.55 1.79
Labor (l) 3.05 1.52
Wealth (w) 6.03 3.11
Information Flow () 0.73 0.81
Table 10a: Statistical properties of the Model, M(2;1;1)
 = 0:2; f = 1;  = 1g
Mean St.Dev
Consumption (c) 3.95 1.10
Labor (l) 2.68 1.06
Wealth (w) 5.84 1.86
Information Flow () 1.08 0.68
Cross-Correlation
c ( 1) c l ( 1) l w ( 1) w
(c) 0.72 1 0.60 0.72 0.66 0.68
(l) 0.74 0.72 0.54 1 0.81 0.74
(w) 0.78 0.68 0.63 0.74 0.61 1
Table 10b: Statistical properties of the Model, M(0:2;1;1)
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 = 0:02; f = 1;  = 1g
Mean St.Dev
Consumption (c) 4.16 0.95
Labor (l) 2.26 0.63
Wealth (w) 5.06 1.11
Information Flow () 1.52 0.42
Table 10c: Statistical properties of the Model, M(0:02;1;1)
 = 0:2; f = 3;  = 1g
Mean St.Dev
Consumption (c) 4.02 1.01
Labor (l) 2.90 0.96
Wealth (w) 5.90 1.74
Information Flow () 1.11 0.35
Cross-Correlation
c ( 1) c l ( 1) l w ( 1) w
(c) 0.79 1 0.81 0.91 0.91 0.74
(l) 0.66 0.91 0.51 1 0.74 0.64
(w) 0.86 0.74 0.58 0.64 0.66 1
Table 10d: Statistical properties of the Model M(0:2;3;1)
 = 0:2; f = 1;  = 0:25g
Mean St.Dev
Consumption (c) 4.11 0.69
Labor (l) 3.01 0.94
Wealth (w) 5.00 1.02
Information Flow () 1.21 0.29
Cross-Correlation
c ( 1) c l ( 1) l w ( 1) w
(c) 0.92 1 0.59 0.73 0.66 0.71
(l) 0.54 0.73 0.63 1 0.82 0.89
(w) 0.68 0.71 0.77 0.89 0.72 1
Table 10e: Statistical properties of the Model M(0:2;1;0:25)
 = 0:2; f = 1;  = 4g
Mean St.Dev
Consumption (c) 3.32 0.99
Labor (l) 2.20 0.74
Wealth (w) 5.07 1.31
Information Flow () 0.98 0.59
Table 10f : Statistical properties of the Model M(0:2;1;4)
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8.2 Figures
Comparing consumption for di¤erent utilities, =0:2
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Figure 8 :Blue: =1;=0; Green: =1;=1; Violet:=3;=0.
Comparing labor and wealth for di¤erent utilities, =0:2
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Figure 9 :Blue: =1;=0; Green: =1;=1; Violet:=3;=0.
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Comparing savings for di¤erent utilities, =0:2
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Figure 10 :Blue: =1;=0; Green: =1;=1; Violet:=3;=0.
Comparing wealth, consumption, savings and income for di¤erent 0s, u(c;l)=log(c)  l1+
1+
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Figure 11 :Blue: =2; Violet:=0:2; Green: =0:02.
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9 Appendix C: Rigidity of Labor and Consumption
Choices
This section builds up a low-dimension intuition for the solution strategy of the model in
the section 2 before turning to the formal solution and its ndings. Consider a consumer
who can choose to consume a quantity in the set 
c 
 
clow chigh

. Each period, he
decides whether to work 
l  (fl = 0g _ fl = 1g) in exchange for a salary s. Assume for
simplicity no asset but a xed initial endowment w = 2: The budget constraint is:
c  w + s1fl=1g (33)
where 1fl=1g indicates whether the consumer works.
Let u (c; l)  log c l denotes the utility of the consumer. Moreover, to make matters
concrete, let clow = 2, chigh = 4 and  = 0:3 and s = 2 with probability p and s = 1 with
probability (1  p)
Under full information capacity and no uncertainty, the agent will work i¤:
c  s (34)
The solution for this problem is clearly (chigh; l = 1) i¤ p  0:2 and (clow; l = 0) if.p > 0:2:
Now assume that it is prohibitively costly for the agent to know the probability of the
outcomes for s. In this case, it is optimal for the consumer to choose (clow; l = 0).
Under rational inattention, the agent can reduce his uncertainty up to an amount
given by his ability of processing information. Such a constraint, expressed in terms of
change in entropy is the Shannon channel. The reduction in uncertainty is obtained by
choosing the distribution of a signal informative about the underlying state (salary) as
much as the Shannon channel allows it. In particular, there are 3 possible choices the con-
sumer can make and that satisfy (33), i.e.,

(chigh; l = 1) ; (clow; l = 1) ; (clow; l = 0)
	
:
With the constraint that the joint distribution p (fc; lg ; s) delivers as marginal for s
Pr (s = 1) = p and Pr (s = 2) = 1  p, the joint distribution is
C;LnS s1 s2
(clow; l = 1) z2 z3
(clow; l = 0) p  z2 (1  p)  z1   z3
(chigh; l = 1) 0 z1
:
The problem of the consumer is then to
max
zi
E (u (c; l))
= u (chigh; l = 1) z1 + u (clow; l = 1) (z2 + z3) + u (clow; l = 0) (1  z1   z2   z3)
s.t.
I (p (s; a)) =
X
s
X
fc;lg
p (fc; lg ; s) log

p (fc; lg ; s)
(
P
s0 p (fc; lg ; s0)) g (s)

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The rst order condition are
@z1 :
u (chigh; l = 1)  u (clow; l = 0) = 

ln

z1
1  z1   z2   z3

@z2 :
u (clow; l = 1)  u (clow; l = 0) = 

ln

z2 + z3
z1

  ln

1  z1   z2   z3
p  z2

@z3 :
u (clow; l = 1)  u (clow; l = 0) = 

ln

z2 + z3
z3

  ln

1  z1   z2   z3
(1  p)  z1   z3

The set of rst order conditions yield a system of simultaneous trascendental equa-
tions. This system of transcendental equations involving logarithms can be solved using
the LambertW function., which is an inverse mapping satisfying W (y) eW (y) = y and
thus logW (y) + W (y) = log y. This function has multiple branches, Branches 0 and
 1 are the only ones that can take on non-complex values. Let y = ex. To solve the
three equations, combine the last two F.O.C.s and plug the solution in the rst using the
constraints on the marginals. Let !i  u (ci; l = 1) u (clow; l = 0) where i  (chigh; clow).
Then the solution for zi is given by
zi =
 = (!i + p)
W ((= (!i + p)) e (1+p)=!)
: (35)
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Figure 11 below illustrates the behavior of z1 as function of , p and !1.
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Figure 11 :An analitical solution
10 Appendix D
Pseudocode
Let  be the shadow cost associated to  = I (A;W ). Dene a Model as a pair (; ; ).
For a given specication :
 Step 1: Build the simplex. Construct a uniform grid to approximate each g (w)-simplex
point.
 Step 2: For each simplex point, dene p (w; c; l). and initialize with V

g0aj ()

= 0:
 Step 3: For each simplex point, nd p (w; a; c) s.t.
V0 (g (w))jp(w;c;l) = maxp(w;c;l)
 P
w2W
P
a2A

c1 t
1     l
+1
+1

p(w;c;l)
   []

:
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 Step 4: For each simplex point, compute g0aj () =
P
w2W T (;w; c; a) p (wjc; l). Use a
kernel regression to interpolate V0 (g (w)) into g0aj ().
 Step 5: Optimize using csminwel and iterate on the value function up to convergence.
Obs. Convergence and Computation Time vary with the specication (; ; ).
! 120-220 iterations each taking 8min-20min
 Step 6. For each model (; ; ), draw from the ergodic p (w; c; l) a sample (ct; lt; wt)
and simulate the time series of consumption, wealth, expected wealth and information
ow by averaging over 1000 draws.
 Step 7. Generate histograms of consumption and impulse response function of consump-
tion to temporary positive and negative shocks to income.
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